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1. INTRODUCTION
China has experienced a more than 30 years high rate of economic growth
since 1978 and overtaken Japan as the second largest economy in the world
since 2010.1 Among the many signs of China’s development is a surge in
Chinese cross-border M&As (hereafter, CBMAs). Armed with more than
US$3 trillion in foreign currency reserves, China is on a worldwide shopping
spree. The total value of China’s CBMA transactions grew from US$1.7
billion in 2000 to US$43 billion in 2011.2 Despite this substantial increase
in outbound activities and the emergence of the Chinese economy, much of
the prior literature on CBMAs are focused in the western economies. Given
that a significant proportion of CBMAs are undertaken by state-owned
enterprises (hereafter, SOEs) in China, which are potentially incentivized
and managed differently from typical firms in a market-oriented economy, it
would be doubtful if the mainstream theories and empirical findings derived
from the western economies are applicable in China; thus, China serves as
unique testing ground and is particularly interesting for research purposes.
In this paper, we focus on examining two country-specific determinants
of Chinese CBMAs, industry preference and currency appreciation. Indus-
try preference refers to special political and financial treatments toward
Chinese resource-related bidders. The “go global” policy, which was first
spelled out in China’s tenth five year plan, specifically encourages resource-
related firms to acquire abroad to secure energy and other natural resources
for China’s growth over the middle- to long-term.
Internationally, this industry preference has raised major concerns from
western countries regarding China’s intentions for natural resource-related
sectors. In addition, these deals are usually high profile and proposed by
SOEs, which causes foreigners to worry about whether resource-related
deals affect national interests or confer unfair advantages on the acquired
firms.
Domestically, acquisitions carried out by resource-related bidders are
more likely to bear potential conflict of interests between the pursuit of na-
tional goals and maximization of shareholders’ wealth. At the same time,
they are more likely to be supported politically and financially by the cen-
tral government than those in any other industries. Hence, we attempt
to examine and understand the value consequences of foreign acquisitions
carried out by resource-related bidders.
The second determinant we aim to explore here is Renminbi (hereafter,
RBM) appreciation. Over the last three decades, the spectacular growth
of China’s export sector and massive inflows of foreign direct investment
1Source: BBC News Business — China overtakes Japan as world’s second-biggest
economy, 14 February 2011.
2Source: Thomson One Banker.
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(hereafter, FDI) have resulted in an enormous store of foreign exchange re-
serves, which puts upward pressure on the RMB exchange rate. On July 21,
2005, China officially revalued its currency to RMB8.11: US$1 and mod-
ified the exchange rate system. Since then, the nominal exchange rate of
RBM has strengthened by 24%. Even more strikingly, according to calcu-
lations by The Economist, the real exchange rate of RBM has strengthened
by almost 50% since 2005.3 Despite that the appreciation of RMB over the
past decade has spurred many Chinese firms to shop for acquisition targets
overseas, little is known about the wealth effect of currency appreciation-
driven acquisitions from earlier literature. To our knowledge, the only study
that examines the relationship between the Chinese RMB exchange rate
and bidder returns is that by Black et al. (2015). Those authors propose
that RMB appreciation could benefit acquiring firms’ shareholders if the
acquiring firms can make acquisitions more cheaply abroad, but fail to find
any support for this proposition. The results of that study could be limited
due to small sample size (43 CBMAs) because the authors only consider
acquirers that are listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.
In this paper, we construct a more comprehensive dataset comprising 111
successfully completed CBMAs announced between 1 January 2002 and 31
January 2011 that were undertaken all Chinese acquirers listed on every
stock exchange to assess first, how market reacts to CBMAs undertaken by
strategic (resource-related) bidders over both the short and long terms; sec-
ond, whether any wealth effect resulting from the substantial appreciation
of the RMB can be transformed into significant wealth gains for acquiring
firms’ shareholders in both the short and long terms.
We find that although resource-related bidders tend to induce conflicts
of interests by engaging in foreign acquisitions to pursue national strategic
goals, these deals are not detrimental to shareholders’ wealth. Indeed, they
add value to bidding firms’ shareholder both around the deal announcement
and in the long run. We suggest that this value-enhancement could arise
due to several reasons, such as resource-related bidders often engage in
acquisitions of targets with substantial tangible assets (i.e., deals that are
easier to integrate); more likely to be supported by the government both
politically and financially given their interests are aligned with that of
the government to facilitate China’s development; or the high levels of
media attention and unfavorable perceptions from western countries they
face strive them to overcome such tensions by putting more efforts in pre-
acquisition planning.
Furthermore, although RMB appreciation increases relative wealth and
lower costs of capital for Chinese acquirers, we only find a significant out-
3Source: The Economist, The Yuan-Dollar Exchange Rate, Nominally Cheap or Re-
ally Dear? Nov 4th 2010.
212 NAN HU, YUN (IVY) ZHANG, AND SONGTAO TAN
performance of abnormal returns for acquirers engaged in appreciation-
driven CBMAs in the short term, with long-term outperformance being
insignificant. By carrying out further analyses, we find that as acquirer’s
free cash flows-to-equity increases, currency appreciation actually has a
significantly negative impact on its long-term abnormal returns, indicat-
ing that currency appreciation aggravates empire building or their agency
problems, and offsets its benefits.
Our work has several important contributions. First, by employing the
most comprehensive dataset of Chinese CBMAs, we empirically examine
the difference in bidder performance between resource-related and non-
resource related industries to ascertain whether political interests in ac-
quiring resources and shareholder value creation are mutually achievable.
Second, this is the first study that documents potential costs and benefits
of RMB appreciation on acquirer performance in China. Third, our results
add to the empirical literature on behavioural finance by demonstrating
that currency appreciation has a significantly negative effect on acquirers
over the long-term for cash-rich firms given that the managers of these firms
are more likely to build their empire or extract private benefits. Finally,
our work suggests that in order for RMB appreciation to transform into
real wealth gains for shareholders, China is advised to continue evolving its
corporate governance system, so that shareholder protection can be better
protected and corporate decisions can be better monitored.
The reminder of this paper is orgnized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and
methodology. Section 4 presents results and discussion. Finally, Section 5
concludes the paper.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. The Emergence of China and Motivations behind Chinese
CBMAs
The economic reforms introduced by China in 1978 were founded on
openness to commerce with the rest of the world. Since that time, China’s
export sectors have served as a remarkable engine for China’s spectacular
growth. To ensure that China’s reformed and market-oriented economic
system continues to flourish, the government started to encouraging com-
panies to invest overseas and thus launched the “go global” policy in 1999.
The “go global” policy has three main purposes: first, it aims to allevi-
ate the pressure to appreciate the RMB; second, it aims to sustain the
resources necessary for China’s growth over the medium to long term; and
third, it aims to support local companies’ efforts to gain competitiveness
through the appropriation of foreign technology and the assimilation of
modern business practices (Gu and Reed, 2010).
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In 2001, the Chinese government identified outward direct investment as
one of the keystones of its 2001-2006 Tenth Five-Year Plan and set aside
500 billion US dollars for outbound investment within these five years. The
urge to go global intensified when China joined the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) in 2001 because its participation in this group created not only
opportunities for Chinese companies to expand their trade but also inten-
sive competition between local and foreign companies within the domestic
market. In 2006, the Chinese government reinforced the go global policy
in its 2006-2010 Eleventh Five-Year Plan, aiming to bring the corporate
sector in line with China’s globalization. The most recent five-year plan,
the 2011-2015 Twelfth Five-Year Plan, has clear targets in place, includ-
ing a 17% increase in overseas investment, which contemplates overseas
investment of US$150 billion by 2015.4
2.2. Existing Literature on Chinese CBMA Performance
Despite the recent surge in CBMA activity, few academic studies empir-
ically examine the performance of Chinese acquirers in CBMAs. Rather,
existing studies of Chinese CBMAs are merely reviews of existing theories,
descriptions of the current situation and case studies.
Boateng, Wang and Yang (2008) examine the strategic motivation and
performance of 27 CBMAs conducted between 2000 and 2004 by Chinese
acquirers listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. They
find that Chinese CBMAs are driven primarily by strategic motivations,
for example, to facilitate international expansion and diversification, to
increase market share and power and to acquire strategic assets, and to
overcome government-mandated barriers. In terms of merger performance,
they find that Chinese acquirers experience significantly positive announce-
ment returns of 1.3% three days around the merger announcement, which
supports the view that CBMAs enable international firms to create value
for their shareholders by exploiting imperfections in product, factor and
capital markets.
Chen and Young (2010) test the relationship between state ownership
and acquirer performance by looking at 39 Chinese CBMAs conducted
from 2000 to 2008. They proposed two hypotheses, the first being that
increased state ownership in the acquiring firms will lead investors to view
the deal in less favorable terms (the principal-principal conflict) and the
second being that environmental complexity will moderate the negative ef-
fect of the principal-principal conflict (the moderating effect). They find
support the principal-principal conflict by observing a negative relationship
between government ownership in the acquiring firm and merger announce-
ment returns but find no support for the moderating effect.
4Source: MOFCOM’s 12th Five-Year Plan for utilization of foreign investment, 15
May, 2012.
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Gu and Reed (2010) investigate whether stock markets view Chinese
CBMAs as value enhancing for shareholders and whether there is a change
in the market perception of CBMAs between before the go global period
and after the “go global” period. Their results indicate that throughout
the entire sample period, the market do not perceive CBMAs as value-
destroying. In addition, they find that whatever the role national strategic
interest plays in motivating Chinese CBMAs after the go global policy, it
is unlikely that this motivation has come at the expense of shareholder
wealth.
Black et al. (2015) compare the performance of Chinese domestic and
cross-border mergers from 2000 to 2009 and find that CBMA acquirers
enjoy significantly higher returns over the long term, although short term
CBMA returns are more negative than those of domestic deals. They also
find that acquirers’ returns vary substantially according to acquirer size
and to target characteristics.
2.3. Hypotheses Development
Over the past decade, Chinese resource-related acquirers have secured
a large number cross-border deals in various regions over the world and
attracted intense media coverage. One key distinction of resource-related
bidders from the others is that they are more closely controlled and nur-
tured by the central government. It means that these firms are more likely
to sacrifice shareholders wealth to pursue national strategic goals, but at
the same time, they are more likely to be supported politically and fi-
nancially by the government than firms in any other industries.5 While a
stream of literature has examined the effect of government involvement on
the performance of Chinese firms overall (e.g., Qi et al., 2000; Sun et al.,
2002; Chen and Young, 2010; and Zhou et al., 2012), less attention has
been paid on whether the national and corporate interests can be achieved
mutually in these strategic firms, albeit their importance and uniqueness.
A recent related study by Gu and Reed (2010), in which a sample of 157
Chinese outbound M&As (OMAs) from 1994 to 2009 are examined. They
find that although OMAs exhibit conflicts of interests between the pub-
lic sector in pursuing national interests and private sector in maximizing
shareholder wealth, especially those carried out post the implementation
of the “Go Global” policy, they do not have an adverse wealth effect on ac-
5For example, with respect to more flexible legislation, the National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2011 increased the scope of its provincial-level
approval authority to US$300 million for the resource-related sector and to US$100
million for other sectors to accelerate the approval process. With respect to easier access
to financing, the Chinese government created two special funds to support companies
undertaking mine investment overseas in 2009; these companies are also able to obtain
access to outward economic and technical cooperation funding from the Ministry of
Finance.
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quiring firms’ shareholders, neither before nor under the go global periods.
Moreover, Black et al. (2015) compare the abnormal returns of Chinese
domestic to foreign acquisitions between 2000 and 2009. They show that
the market reacts positively to deals targeted at energy, materials and
technology sectors, in the short run but for domestic deals only, indicating
that external political biases against China are unfounded. Inspired by the
above studies, we suggest that if resource-related bidders respond primar-
ily to top-down policies to initiate CBMAs, then the following hypothesis
should be satisfied:
H1: Resource-related bidders earn lower abnormal returns than non-
resource-related bidders in Chinese CBMAs.
On the contrary, if resource-related bidders advance national interests,
while at the same time maintain or improve firm performances, then the
following hypothesis should be satisfied:
H2: Resource-related bidders earn higher (or at least not worse) abnor-
mal returns than non-resource-related bidders in Chinese CBMAs.
Much attention has been paid to the RMB exchange rate in recent years,
and the U.S. has placed commercial pressure on China to appreciate its cur-
rency against dollar. After keeping the RMB fixed at RMB8.27: US$1 for
more than ten years during a period of high growth and declining inflation
rates, the People’s Bank of China announced on 21st of July 2005 that it
would revalue RMB exchange rate to RMB8.11: US$1 and lift its de facto
fixed peg of the RMB to the USD by implementing a managed float system.
Since then, the nominal rate of the RMB against the USD has appreciated
over 20% (McKinnon, 2005; Qin and He, 2011), and even more so, the
real exchange rate of RBM has strengthened by almost 50%, according to
The Economist.6 Most existing literature on the RMB exchange rate has
focused on issues related to the risks and opportunities associated with fu-
ture exchange rate movements,7 less attention has been given to the impact
of RMB appreciation on the volume and performance of Chinese CBMAs
after removal of the peg.
Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2012) discover that currency movement is a ma-
jor factor in determining the pattern of CBMAs such that firms in coun-
tries whose currencies have appreciated (depreciated) are more likely to
be acquirers (targets). Moreover, they suggest that the effect of currency
movements on merger likelihood is likely to be indicative of a more general
valuation effect such that higher-valued firms tend to purchase lower-valued
6Source: The Economist, The Yuan-Dollar Exchange Rate, Nominally Cheap or Re-
ally Dear? Nov 4th 2010.
7For example, whether RMB appreciation will lead to a zero-interest liquidity trap in
Chinese financial markets that will render the central bank helpless to combat future
deflation, similar to the earlier experience of Japan (McKinon (2006), McKinnon (2005)
and Qiao (2005)).
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firms and that the wealth explanation is a more appropriate argument for
this scenario than the mispricing explanation is.
Chen, Officer and Shen (2014) extend to examine the effect of currency
appreciation(either temporary or permanent) on acquiring firms’ wealth
creation in an international context and find that CBMAs led by acquiring
firms with “large currency appreciation” generate higher short- and long-
term abnormal returns. The short-term wealth enhancement is more pro-
nounced when acquiring firm is from a country with better corporate gov-
ernance and legal environments. The outperformance for post-acquisition
returns is more pronounced for acquiring firms with stronger shareholder
rights.8
Another study by Black et al. (2015) specifically examine Chinese CB-
MAs and suggest that RMB appreciation could benefit bidding firms’ wealth
creation if they are able to acquire more cheaply abroad, but find no ev-
idence to support this argument. Their results could be limited by the
relatively small sample size (43 CBMAs) because theyonly consider the ac-
quirers listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. In this paper,
we use a more comprehensive dataset comprising 111 CBMAs undertaken
by Chinese acquirers listed on all stock exchanges with available account-
ing information. Given that since the implementation of the exchange rate
reform, RMB has undergone a long-term sustained unilateral appreciation
(similarly to a permanent appreciation), we propose the following testable
hypothesis:
H3: Chinese bidders earn higher abnormal returns in the period after
currency appreciation than in the period before currency appreciation9 due
to the lower cost of capital and increased relative wealth.
Moreover, Chen, Officer and Shen (2014) suggest that similar to over-
valued stock market valuation, overvalued currency might also aggravate
empire building, or other agency problems, and offsets the benefit of cur-
rency appreciation. Following this line of thought, we propose the following
hypothesis:
H4: Chinese bidders earn lower(or at least not higher) abnormal returns
in the period after currency appreciation than in the period before currency
appreciation.
8Chen, Officer and Shen (2014) find that acquiring firms from weak corporate and
shareholder rights countries are more likely to overpay their targets following large cur-
rency appreciation, thus result in lower announcement returns for acquiring firms’ share-
holders. Moreover, acquiring firms from countries with weak shareholder rights make
poor choices of targets and thus, any synergies generated over the long term might be
so negative as to offset any benefit from currency appreciation-driven CBMAs.
9We classify the Currency Appreciation period as the period after the RMB exchange
rate reform on 21 July 2005.
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1. Sample selection and data description
We collect a sample of Chinese CBMAs announced between 1 January
2002 and 31 January 2011 from Thomson One Banker. The original sam-
ple contains 1,205 deals. We require bidders to be listed firms and exclude
from the sample leveraged buyouts, spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tenders,
exchange offers, repurchases and privatizations, leaving us with 394 trans-
actions. Among those transactions, we include only successful deals, which
results in a sample of 225 deals. Following Gu and Reed (2010), we ex-
clude deals in which either the bidder or target operates within the financial
sector because the financial reporting standards and requirements of the
financial sector differ from those of other sectors, which yields a sample
of 167 transactions. Finally, we exclude deals that are missing accounting
information, which gives us a total number of 111 CBMAs.
We collect a number of informational items from Thomson One Banker,
including the name, nationality, public status, DataStream code, primary
industry as measured by the four-digit Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) code of each acquirer and target; and the announcement, effective,
and withdrawn dates, method of payment of each deal. In addition, the
following data are obtained from Thomson DataStream: each acquirer’s
share price, market value, market-to-book value, leverage, funds from op-
erations and common equity; and market indexes for Standard and Poor’s
/ Toronto Stock Exchange Composite, Standard and Poor’s / Australian
Stock Exchange 300, FTSE Bursa Malaysia Klci, FTSE Bursa Malaysia
ACE, Standard and Poor’s / Hkex GEM, Hang Sheng, FTSE AIM All-
Share, TSE Mothers, NASDAQ Composite, New York Stock Exchange
Composite, Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite, Shenzhen Stock Ex-
change Composite, Shenzhen Stock Exchange SME Composite, Shenzhen
Chinext Composite, MDAX Frankfurt and MSCI Singapore.
3.2. Measurement of short-term cumulative abnormal returns
To capture the stock market’s initial reaction to a merger announcement,
we employ the market-adjusted approach developed by Fuller et al. (2002)
to measure abnormal returns (ARs) as
ARi,t = ri,t − rm(i),t (1)
where ARi,t is the abnormal return for firm i on day t, ri,t and rm(i),t are
the daily return of firm i and the value-weighted stock exchange index daily
return (market) at which firm i is listed on at day t, respectively. They
are calculated as the difference between the natural logarithms of the stock
price index on days t and t− 1 for firm i and the market, respectively. We
then sum the 3-day abnormal returns to obtain the cumulative abnormal
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returns (CARs) in the event window (−1,+1), where 0 is the announcement





In addition, to ensure the reliability of our results, we extend the short-
run event window to 5 days as a robustness check.10
3.3. Measurement of long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns
To examine the stock price effects in the long term, we follow the buy-
and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) approach employed by Buchheim et
al. (2001), which measures the difference between the compounded actual








where Ri,t and Rm(i),t refer to the monthly return of firm i and value-
weighted stock exchange index monthly return (market) at which firm i is
listed on in month t, respectively.
The BHARs are calculated over a 24-month period beginning one month
after the deal announcement and then over a 12-months period beginning
one month after the deal announcement as a robustness check.11 While
BHARs are frequently used in modern event studies, we note that they can
suffer from the effects of compounding expected returns, thereby produc-
ing statistically significant results even when none are due to short-term
influences (Fama, 1998), and have a potential positive skewness problem
(Kothari and Warner, 1997). Thus, to address these problems, we follow
Sutton (1993) and report bootstrapped, skewness-adjusted t-statistics in
our portfolio analysis. Lyon et al. (1999) find that this method of cal-
culating the significance of abnormal returns improves the test statistic
specifications.
3.4. Empirical Model
Our empirical model aims to test how market reacts to CBMAs under-
taken by strategic (resource-related) bidders and during currency appreci-
ation period over both the short and long terms. We control for various
acquirer- and deal-specific characteristics known to affect acquirer returns
10The results in the 5-day CAR robustness test are consistent with our main findings.
11The results in the 12-month BHARs robustness test are consistent with our main
findings.
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and the primary multivariate frame work is shown as below:
CAR or BHAR = α+ β1 × Resource − Related BidderDummy
+β2 × Currency Appreciation Dummy
+β3 × Cash Flows-to-Equity
+β4 × Run−Up + β5 × ln(Size)
+β6 × Book− to− Market + β7 × Leverage
+β8 × Payment incl. Stock Dummy
+β9 × Public Deal Dummy
+β10 × Diversifying Deal Dummy
The dependent variable in our model is either CAR or BHAR, which
are the market reactions to a merger announcement in the short and long
terms, respectively. Our main results are the three-day CAR around the
merger announcement date and the BHAR over the twenty-four months
beginning one month after the deal announcement. The main variables of
interest are Resource-Related Bidder and Currency Appreciation dummies.
The Resource-Related Bidder dummy equals to one if the bidder operates
in the energy and materials industry sectors, and zero otherwise. The
Currency Appreciation dummy equals to one if the merger is conducted
after the RMB exchange rate reform on 21 July 2005, and zero otherwise.
The rest of the variables are defined and described as below:
Cash Flows-to-Equity is the funds from operations divided by the com-
mon equity at one year before the deal announcement.12 In contrast to
the debt-monitoring theory, the free cash flow theory suggests that cash
flow increases the agency costs of firms and results in poor investment
opportunities because managers with more free cash flow tend to invest in
negative net present value projects when positive net present value projects
are no longer available rather than paying cash out to shareholders (Stulz
(1990) and Jensen (1986)). Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) extend on the
free cash flow theory and find that acquirer announcement returns and cash
flow are negatively correlated but that the negative correlation is more pro-
nounced for firms with poor investment opportunities. Moreover, Harford
(1999) examines the acquisition behaviour of cash-rich firms and finds that
they have more agency conflicts and are more likely to make acquisitions.
Consistent with the free cash hypothesis, the acquisitions of cash-rich firms
are value-destroying, as evidenced by negative acquirer announcement re-
12Funds from operations represent the sum of net income and all non-cash charges or
credits. It is the cash flow of the company.
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turns and poor post-acquisition operating performance of the combined
firm.
Run-Up is the market-adjusted BHAR over a three-month period end-
ing one week before the deal announcement. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny
(1990) examine the incentives for managerial decisions by analysing the
relationship between acquirers’ past performance and acquirer returns on
acquisitions and find that bad managers make bad acquisitions simply be-
cause they are bad managers, which is consistent with the notion that poor
performance drives managers to try something new. Alternatively, Rosen
(2006) finds that idiosyncratic acquirer returns are weakly negatively re-
lated to acquirer announcement returns. His results support a particular
version of Roll’s hubris hypothesis, which predicts that the worst acquisi-
tions are made by well performing firms because their managers are most
likely to be infected by hubris.
ln(Size) is the natural logarithm of the bidder’s market value of equity
one month prior to the deal announcement and listed in millions of US
dollars at the exchange rate as of December 2010. Moeller, Schlingemann
and Stulz (2004) document a significant negative effect of firm size on
announcement returns, which might be due either to the lack of analyst
coverage of small firms, which results in profitable opportunities for in-
vestors when a firm’s stock price deviates temporarily from its real value,
or to the higher risk is associated with smaller firms, which yields higher
returns for investors. Although Black et al. (2012) do not find a negative
correlation between firm size and Chinese acquirer performance in the short
term, they discover a significantly positive correlation over the long term,
whereby increases in firm size lead to higher acquirer returns.
Book-to-Market is the book value of equity divided by the market value
of equity one month prior to the deal announcement. Jensen (2005) sug-
gests that high valuations increase managerial discretion; consequently,
managers tend to undertake less favourable acquisitions when good ac-
quisitions are no longer available. Dong et al. (2006) find that acquirers
with higher valuation are likely to experience lower announcement period
returns. However, Zhou et al. (2015) evaluate the performance of Chinese
acquirers that engage in domestic M&As and find a positive relationship be-
tween market-to-book ratio and acquirer returns in the short-run, whereas
the opposite trend is observed in the long-run.
Leverage is used as a proxy for its financial risk and is calculated as
(long-term debt + short-term debt & current portion of long-term debt) /
(total capital + short-term debt & current portion of long-term debt) at one
year prior to the acquisition announcement. Jensen and Meckling (1976),
Harris and Raviv (1990), and Stulz (1990) suggest that debt can alleviate
agency conflicts between stockholders and managers, which is commonly
known as the debt-monitoring theory. Maloney, Macormick and Mitchell
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(1993) find evidence to support this theory in context of the M&A market;
specifically, they show that leverage is positively correlated with acquirer
announcement returns because it helps to reduce agency costs and forces
managers to work harder to maximize the cash flow of existing capital and
to search for new positive net present value investments. However, they
also note that the benefit of debt can be limited by its high cost, which
can lead to underinvestment, asset substitution and bankruptcy costs in
the normal corporate setting.
Payment incl. Stock is a dummy variable equal to one if the deal is
financed with at least some stock.Travlos (1987) suggests that in a world
characterised by asymmetric information, an all-cash offer indicates poten-
tial undervaluation of the acquiring firm and will result in non-negative
announcement returns for the acquirer, whereas an all-stock payment sig-
nals potential overvaluation of the acquiring firm and will cause significant
losses for the acquirer at the announcement. His results are consistent with
the signaling hypothesis. Moreover, Chang (1998) compares the announce-
ment returns for privately held and publicly listed targets when stock and
cash offers are used and find that in contrast to the negative abnormal
returns typically found for publicly traded targets, acquirers experience
positive announcement returns on stock offers when the target is privately
held. Black et al. (2015) find Chinese bidders benefit from using stock as
payment and suggest it can be attributed to their shrewd ability to buy
when the market is low and benefit as the market recovers.
Public Deals is a dummy variable which equals which equal one for deals
targeting publicly listed firms, and zero otherwise. Recent literature shows
that acquirers obtain positive announcement returns when they purchase
privately held targets but experience zero to negative returns when they
purchase publicly held targets. This difference in performance is commonly
known as the private target discount and is explained generally by the
following hypotheses: acquisitions of private firms result in more effective
monitoring through the creation of blockholders; there are fewer agency
problems associated with private acquisitions (for example, bidding firms’
managers are more likely to suffer from empire-building incentives when
acquiring large listed targets); and there is a lack of market liquidity for and
more information asymmetry with private targets (Chang, 1998; Koeplin,
Sarin, and Shapiro, 2000; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004; Faccio,
McConnell, and Stolin, 2006; Officer, 2007).
Diversifying Deals is a dummy variable equal to one for deals in which
the bidder’s industry differs from the target’s as defined by the two-digit
SIC code, and zero otherwise. There is a considerable literature on the
impact of industry relatedness on acquirer value creation. On the one
hand, many studies find that diversification is value-destroying for acquir-
ers, whereas the opposite is true for focused acquisitions. This diversifi-
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cation discount is usually justified by agency theory, overinvestment and
cross-subsidization arguments and by the inefficient allocation of resources
between firms in different industries (Megginson, Morgan and Nail, 2004;
Dos Santos, Errunza and Miller, 2008). On the other hand, Black et al.
(2012) compare the merger performance of Chinese and U.S. bidders and
find that the diversifying effect exists in U.S. market but does not play a
significant role in China. Other studies reveal that diversifying acquisitions
are value-enhancing for acquiring firms’ shareholders and suggest that this
diversification premium might emanate from enhanced economies of scope
and market power, the coinsurance effect, and internal capital market effi-
ciencies (Matsusaka, 1993; Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia, 1999).
3.5. Sample statistics
3.5.1. Time Series Distribution of Chinese CBMAs Stratified by Target
Nationality
Table 1 reports the time-series distribution of Chinese CBMAs strati-
fied by target nationality. We find that the number of completed M&As
has tripled between 2002 and 2010. Indeed, after a dramatic increase be-
tween 2007 and 2008, more than 20 deals are conducted during each year.
In particular, we observe that in 2009, when most developed countries
remain mired in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the number
of successfully completed CBMAs reached a record high, accounting for
25 deals in our sample. Almost half of these deals are targeted at firms
in cash-strapped economies, such as the United States, Canada and Aus-
tralia. This boost in merger activity can be attributed to many factors,
such as China’s increasing economic power; the implementation of a series
of government programs designed to encourage outward FDI projects to al-
leviate China’s resource bottleneck, facilitate industrial upgrades, improve
innovation capabilities, and increase the competence of Chinese firms on
the global market (Morck, Yeung and Zhao, 2008); and the global financial
crisis, which altered foreign countries’ attitudes towards Chinese acquir-
ers and created myriad opportunities for them to buy assets more cheaply
abroad.
Table 1 also shows that in terms of the deal volume time distribution
of targets based on nationality, there are three top destinations for Chi-
nese CBMAs: Hong Kong, the United States, and Australia. Hong Kong
targets account for more than 17% of total deal volume. We note that
there is a major shift in target country preference over time. Prior to 2007,
Hong Kong, Indonesia and Germany were the most targeted destinations,
whereas since 2007, firms in Hong Kong, the United States, Australia,
Singapore, Canada and Japan have become the preferred targets of Chi-
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TABLE 1.
Time Distribution of Targets by Nations
Nation 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Jan. 2011 Total
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Australia 1 0 1 0 0 2 3 3 3 0 13
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 3
British Virgin 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 5
Cayman Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
France 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 4
Germany 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 5
Hong Kong 1 3 2 2 1 3 4 2 1 0 19
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3
India 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2
Indonesia 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 5
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2
Netherlands 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 3
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
Peru 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Russian Fed 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2
Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 6
South Korea 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
Taiwan 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
United Kingdom 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
United States 2 0 1 0 0 2 2 4 4 2 17
Total 8 3 8 3 3 8 22 25 24 7 111
This table shows the time-series distribution of Chinese cross-border M&As and of tar-
gets stratified by their nation. The figures shown represent the number of deals con-
ducted within each target nation by year.
nese acquirers. This evolution of target country preference from primarily
emerging markets to developed markets not only signals the level of market
development but also indicates the radical expansion of Chinese acquirers
into overseas assets.
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3.5.2. Acquirer CAR and BHAR Stratified by Acquirer Industry
Table 2 Panel A shows that CBMAs enjoy insignificant 3-day CAR of
0.86% overall. There is a strong preference for Chinese firms within the ma-
terials, high-technology, industrials and energy sectors to acquire aboard.
The resource-related bidders (those within eitherthe energy or materials
sectors) generate significant abnormal returns of 2.73% in the short term.
TABLE 2.
Acquirer 3-day CAR and 24-month BHAR Stratified by Acquirer Industry
Panel A. Acquirer Short-Term Performance 3-day CAR by Acquirer Industry
Overall CPS Energy Health HT IND Materials Media Realest Retail StaplesTelecom Energy
& Materials
Mean 0.0086 0.0310 0.0227∗∗−0.0488 −0.0112 −0.0116 0.0297∗∗∗ −0.0084 0.0531 0.0217 0.0276−0.0259 0.0273∗∗∗
P-Value (0.129) (0.332) (0.022) (0.284) (0.348) (0.410) (0.009) (0.830) (-) (-) (0.281) (0.268) (0.001)
Panel B. Acquirer Long-Term Performance 24-month BHAR by Acquirer Industry
Mean −0.1286∗∗−0.2766 0.3023 −0.0049−0.3668∗∗−0.0979−0.1669∗∗−0.4988∗∗−0.6637−0.3140 0.0083 0.1246 −0.0027
P-Value (0.025) (0.324) (0.159) (0.964) (0.037) (0.308) (0.032) (0.030) (-) (-) (0.952) (0.827) (0.977)
N 111 6 14 2 23 21 26 3 1 1 11 3 40
Panel A (B) of this table reports the short-term 3-day CAR(−1,+1) around the date of deal announcement (the long-term 24-month
BHAR(0,+24) after the date of deal announcement) stratified by the acquirer industry. The industry sector is classified by acquirer
TF Macro Industry obtained from Thomson One Banker. The equation CARi =
∑n
i=0 ARi is used to calculate CAR, and the
equation BHARi,t =
∏T
t=0[1 + Ri,t] −
∏T
t=0[1 + Rm,t] is used to calculate BAHR. For the abbreviated industries: Overall stands for
all industry sectors in the full sample; CPS stands for Consumer Products and Services; Energy stands for Energy and Power; Health
stands for Healthcare; HT stands for High Technology; IND stands for Industrials; Realest stands for Real Estate; Telcom stands for
Telecommunication; Energy & Materials are classified as Resource-Related sector in our sample. The mean CAR is reported with
p-value in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively. N donates the
number of deals conducted within each industry sector.
Table 2 Panel B indicates that CBMAs are significantly value destroy-
ing for acquirers in the long term, with a negative 24-month BHAR of
−12.86%. Media bidders experience the most significant loss, −49.88%,
whereas resource-related bidders are associated with an insignificant loss
of −0.27% two years after the deal announcement.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1. Short-term multivariate analysis
In this section, we employ multivariate regressions to estimate how the
market reacts to CBMAs undertaken by resource-related bidders and dur-
ing currency appreciation period 3 days around announcement date while
controlling for common bidder- and deal-specific characteristics known to
affect bidder returns. The results are reported in Table 3 and standard
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
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TABLE 3.
Multivariate Regression Analysis for Acquirer 3-day CAR
3-day CAR 3-day CAR 3-day CAR
(1) (2) (3)
Resource-Related Bidder 0.0321∗∗∗ 0.0338∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002)
Currency Appreciation 0.0258∗ 0.0283∗∗
(0.058) (0.029)
Cash Flows-to-Equity −0.0929∗ −0.1018∗∗ −0.0981∗∗
(0.052) (0.038) (0.038)
Run-Up 0.0340 0.0422∗∗ 0.0388∗
(0.117) (0.050) (0.068)
ln(Size) 0.0015 0.0045 0.0007
(0.664) (0.130) (0.832)
Book-to-Market 0.0170 0.0166 0.0144
(0.312) (0.305) (0.386)
Leverage 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004
(0.174) (0.229) (0.178)
Payment incl. Stock 0.0468∗∗ 0.0508∗∗ 0.0400∗
(0.031) (0.034) (0.056)
Public Deal −0.0037 0.0004 −0.0051
(0.760) (0.975) (0.668)
Diversifying Deal −0.0071 −0.0097 −0.0088
(0.601) (0.480) (0.511)
Constant −0.0107 −0.0388 −0.0243
(0.690) (0.189) (0.405)
N 111 111 111
Adjusted-R2 0.131 0.101 0.162
This table presents the results for the multivariate regression analysis of the Chinese
cross-border M&As. In these models, we regress 3-day CAR(−1,+1) around the date of
deal announcement. We include a dummy which takes the value of one — if the bidderis
within energy or materials sector (“Resource-Related Bidder”); if the deal is conducted
after RMB exchange rate reform from 21st July, 2005 (“Currency Appreciation”); if
the deal is financed with at least some stock (“Payment incl. Stock”); if the target is
publicly listed (“Public Deal”); and finally, if the target is in a different industry to
the bidder as measured using the first two digits of the four digit Primary SIC code
of the two firms (“Diversifying Deal”). We also include the acquirer’s cash flows-to-
equity (“Cash Flows-to-Equity”) calculated as the funds from operations divided by the
common equity at one year before the deal announcement. The acquirer’s run-up (“Run-
Up”) calculated as the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of the acquirer’s stock over
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the period beginning 105 days and ending 6 days prior to the announcement date. The
book-to-market value (“Book-to-Market”) of the acquirer as well as the acquirer’s size
(“ln(Size)”) measured one month prior to the announcement of the deal. The acquirer’s
leverage (“Leverage”) calculated as (Long Term Debt + Short Term Debt & Current
Portion of Long Term Debt) / (Total Capital + Short Term Debt & Current Portion
of Long Term Debt) at one year prior to the acquisition announcement. All continuous
variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. The p-values shown in parentheses
areadjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% levels
is denoted ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively.
Regression (3) shows that resource-related bidders are associated with
higher announcement period abnormal returns of 3.38% at a 1% signifi-
cance level, suggesting that although resource-related bidders may carry
out acquisitions to promote national interests, the market do not respond
unfavorably toward them. Indeed, such deals create significant wealth for
bidding firms’ shareholders in the short-term, support our second hypoth-
esis. At the same time, our first hypothesis stating that political influences
divert firms from maximizing shareholders’ wealth is rejected.
The coefficient on currency appreciation is positive and statistically sig-
nificant at a 5% level in our sample. The magnitude of the coefficient
suggests that CBMAs conducted after RMB exchange rate reform are as-
sociated with a 2.83% CAR improvement, ceteris paribus. Our results
indicate that firms can create short-term value for their shareholders by
purchasing foreign assets using their appreciated domestic currency, sup-
porting hypothesis 3. This value enhancement is in line with Chen, Officer
and Shen’s (2014) results, in which they find that CBMAs led by acquirers
with “large currency appreciation” generate higher short- and long-term
abnormal returns either through higher expected earnings or lower cost of
capital. Erel, Liao and Weibach (2012) also suggest that the effect of cur-
rency appreciation on bidder returns is likely to be indicative of a general
valuation effect and is attributed to the wealth explanation (Rhodes-Kropf
and Viswanathan, 2004).
Among the control variables, we find that cash flows-to-equity has a sig-
nificantly negative impact on bidder share-term performance. This correla-
tion is supported by the free cash flow theory such that cash flow increases
the agency costs of acquiring firms and results in poor investment opportu-
nities, and it is also consistent with the findings in prior literature (Lang,
Stulz and Walkling, 1991; Harford, 1999). Moreover, we find that CARs
are significantly higher for acquirers with higher stock price run-ups, sug-
gesting that the market welcomes bidding firms’ managers who have had
recent success to undertake foreign acquisitions.
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Another interesting result we find is the postive market reaction afforeded
to acquisitons with payment involving at least some stock. The same mar-
ket reaction is found by Black et al. (2015), in which the authors explain
such reaction as due to the shrewd ability of Chinese bidders to buy when
the market is low and benefit as the market turns upward. This mar-
ket reaction may also due to that Chinese investors face more information
asymmetry than those in developed economies, they tend to discount pri-
vate targets and view cash financing as value destroying or overpaying. If
this is the case, payment incl. stock deals are more likely to be viewed
as discounted for information asymmetry or more justified for the target’s
value, especially when the target is a privately listed foreign firm. Another
possible explanation, suggested by Wang et al. (2014), is that investors
tend to speculate on and in favour of payment incl. stock deals, as it is
a less frequently used way of financing due to the split-share structure, so
they might look at it as a positive signal.
4.2. Long-term multivariate analysis
To gain additional insights into whether acquisitions carried out by resource-
related bidders and during currency appreciation period serve the interests
of long-term shareholders, we extend our multivariate analysis to the long
term and control for various bidder- and deal-specific characteristics found
to affect BHARs. The results are presented in Table 4.
Regressions (1) and (3) show that resource-related acquirers outper-
form other acquirers over the long term, but the outperformance is only
marginally significant. Our long-term results are in line with that of the
short-term and suggest that resource-related CBMAs promote national in-
terests at the expense of shareholder wealth is unfounded.
However, we find that currency appreciation has an insignificant positive
effect on bidder abnormal returns in the long term. This insignificant
outperformance over the longer time span naturally raises our concerns on
what factors could potentially erode the gains that would otherwise accrue
to acquiring firms’ shareholders in appreciation-driven deals.
Inspired by Chen, Officer and Shen’s (2014) work, in which they find
poor governance (mainly proxied by shareholder protection) drives firms
from countries with appreciated currencies to undertake acquisitions with
lower or even negative synergies, or overpay for target firms, hence offset-
ting any benefits from large currency appreciation deals. China, known
to have high ownership concentration (typically state ownership), high in-
formation asymmetry, and weak institutional environments, the minority
investor protection is weak, thereby empire building incentives and other
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agency costs can play a critical role in currency appreciation-inducted ac-
quisitions.
TABLE 4.
Multivariate Regression Analysis for Acquirer 24-month BHAR
24-month 24-month 24-month 24-month
BHAR BHAR BHAR BHAR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Resource-Related Bidder 0.2328∗ 0.2378∗ 0.2140
(0.083) (0.078) (0.105)
Currency Appreciation 0.0657 0.0832 0.5162∗∗
(0.642) (0.540) (0.039)
Cash Flows-to-Equity −0.2943 −0.3358 −0.3097 1.3039∗
(0.576) (0.541) (0.561) (0.097)
Currency Appreciatione −1.9423∗∗
Cash Flows-to-Equity (0.049)
Run-Up 0.6669∗∗∗ 0.7051∗∗∗ 0.6809∗∗∗ 0.6325∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
ln(Size) −0.0256 −0.0010 −0.0279 −0.0286
(0.437) (0.971) (0.412) (0.403)
Book-to-Market 0.0014 0.0091 −0.0061 −0.0469
(0.991) (0.943) (0.962) (0.726)
Leverage −0.0021 −0.0025 −0.0022 −0.0016
(0.402) (0.358) (0.390) (0.540)
Payment incl. Stock −0.6439∗∗ −0.5884∗∗ −0.6638∗∗ −0.6833∗∗
(0.014) (0.008) (0.015) (0.013)
Public Deal −0.0260 0.0085 −0.0302 −0.0172
(0.823) (0.939) (0.796) (0.881)
Diversifying Deal −0.0942 −0.1053 −0.0990 −0.1068
(0.455) (0.411) (0.431) (0.406)
Constant 0.1764 0.0344 0.1365 −0.2030
(0.595) (0.907) (0.665) (0.527)
N 111 111 111 111
Adjusted-R2 0.124 0.093 0.119 0.135
This table presents the results for the multivariate regression analysis of the Chinese
cross-border M&As. In these models, we regress 24-month BHAR(0,+24) after the
monthof deal announcement. We include a dummy which takes the value of one —
if the bidderis within energy or materials sector (“Resource-Related Bidder”); if the
deal is conducted after RMB exchange rate reform from 21st July, 2005 (“Currency
Appreciation”); if the deal is financed with at least some stock (“Payment incl. Stock”);
if the target is publicly listed (“Public Deal”); and finally, if the target is in a different
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industry to the bidder as measured using the first two digits of the four digit Primary SIC
code of the two firms (“Diversifying Deal”). We also include the acquirer’s cash flows-to-
equity (“Cash Flows-to-Equity”) calculated as the funds from operations divided by the
common equity at one year before the deal announcement. The acquirer’s run-up (“Run-
Up”) calculated as the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of the acquirer’s stock over
the period beginning 105 days and ending 6 days prior to the announcement date. The
book-to-market value (“Book-to-Market”) of the acquirer as well as the acquirer’s size
(“ln(Size)”) measured one month prior to the announcement of the deal. The acquirer’s
leverage (“Leverage”) calculated as (Long Term Debt + Short Term Debt & Current
Portion of Long Term Debt) / (Total Capital + Short Term Debt & Current Portion
of Long Term Debt) at one year prior to the acquisition announcement. Currency
Appreciation×Cash Flows-to-Equityis the interaction term. All continuous variables
are winsorised at the 1% and % levels. The p-values shown in parentheses areadjusted
for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% levels is denoted
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ respectively.
Under this line of thinking and given that the free cash flow theory sug-
gests as cash flow increases, the agency costs of firms increases; we choose to
use cash flow-to-equity as aproxy for agency costs.13 We interact our cash
flows-to-equity variable with the currency appreciation variable and the re-
sults are presented in regression (4). We find that as acquirer’s free cash
flows-to-equity increases, currency appreciation has a significantly negative
impact on acquirer’s long-term abnormal performance. Even more inter-
estingly, the effect of cash flows-to-equity is positive and significant on ac-
quirer’s long-term abnormal returns before the RMB exchange rate reform.
Our results potentially indicate that currency appreciation, or overvalued
currency, can induce agency conflicts between managers and shareholders,
such that managers become tempted to engage in foreign acquisitions to
build their empire or extract private benefits. Similarly, Chen, Officer and
Shen (2014) suggest that “taking advantage of exchange rate mispricing is
not a sufficient condition to benefit shareholders of acquiring firms. The
lack of effective shareholder protection seems to offset (via higher premi-
ums and lower synergies) any benefit from appreciation-driven cross-border
deals, which is exactly what agency theory predicts.”
In terms of other control variables, we find that bidder’s run-up persis-
tently exerts a significantly positive effect on bidder returns over the long
term, whereas the sign on the coefficient of payment incl. stock dummy is
reversed from positive in the short term to negative in the long term. This
13In DataStream, Free Cash Flow is also named as Funds from Operations (World-
scope item: WC04860).
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negative impact of stock payment supports the negative signalling effect of
stock offers and suggests that the market will punish overvalued acquirers
that engage in CBMAs over time.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper examines the wealth effects of acquisitions undertaken by
resource-related bidders and during currency appreciation period in both
the short and long terms. By employing a comprehensive sample of 111
CBMAs conducted by Chinese acquirers listed on all stock exchanges from
1 January 2002 to 31 January 2011, we find that although resource-related
bidders tend to induce conflicts of interests by engaging in foreign acquisi-
tions to pursue national strategic goals, these deals are not detrimental to
shareholders’ wealth. Indeed, they add value to bidding firms’ shareholder
both around the deal announcement and in the long run. We suggest
that this value-enhancement could arise due to several reasons, such as
resource-related bidders often engage in acquisitions of targets with sub-
stantial tangible assets (i.e., deals that are easier to integrate); more likely
to be supported by the government both politically and financially given
their interests are aligned with that of the government to facilitate China’s
development; or the high levels of media attention and unfavorable per-
ceptions from western countries they face strive them to overcome such
tensions by putting more efforts in pre-acquisition planning.
Furthermore, after China officially revalued its currency and modified
its exchange rate system on July 21, 2005, the RMB exchange rate has
strengthened substantially, which has led to increased relative wealth and
lower costs of capital for Chinese acquirers engaged in CBMAs. However,
we only find a significant outperformance of abnormal returns for acquirers
engaged in appreciation-driven CBMAs in the short term, with long-term
outperformance being insignificant. By carrying out further analyses, we
find that as acquirer’s free cash flows-to-equity increases, currency appre-
ciation actually has a significantly negative impact on it long-term ab-
normal returns, indicating that agency conflicts are exacerbated following
currency appreciation. Consequently, we suggest that for RMB apprecia-
tion to transform into real wealth gains for acquiring firms’ shareholders,
China is advised to continue evolve its corporate governance system, so that
shareholder protection can be better protected and corporate decisions can
be better monitored.
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